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Abstract
This article draws on the indigenous African intellectual 
tradition to ground a moral-philosophical theory of leadership 
that is intended to rival accounts prominent in the East Asian 
and Western traditions. After providing an interpretation of 
the characteristically sub-Saharan value of communion, the 
article advances a philosophical account of a good leader as 
one who creates, sustains and enriches communal relationships 
and enables others to do so. The article then applies this 
account to a variety of topics, including what the final end of 
an organisation should be, how decisions ought to be made 
within it, who counts as a stakeholder and how to deal with 
non-performing or misbehaving employees. For each topic, 
the article notes respects in which Afro-communal leadership 
supports approaches that differ from those prescribed by 
other, more internationally familiar philosophies such as 
Confucianism and Kantian contract theory, and it suggests 
that its implications are prima facie attractive relative to them. 
1. Introduction
International academic reflection on good leadership has 
tended to follow the rise of political or economic power, first in 
the West and then in the East. However, there is little reason 
to believe that the presence of power correlates strongly 
with moral-philosophical plausibility. Indeed, from the 
characteristically African perspective this article advances, the 
failure by some societies to have shared political and economic 
power is a prima facie indication that something is mistaken 
with their underlying value systems.
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It has been pointed out that ideas indigenous to Africa are under-represented in the 
English-speaking literature on leadership (Blunt & Jones, 1997; Ncube, 2010:77-78; 
Nkomo, 2011:371). As the authors of a book devoted to personal growth suggest, “Of all 
the gifts that Africa has given the world, African values in leadership have not yet claimed 
the place that they could” (Nussbaum, Palsule & Mkhize, 2010:5). There are a number of 
reasons for thinking that this ignorance of African1 understandings of good leadership 
is unwelcome. Two familiar rationales are that it is immoral, because disrespectful, 
to disregard an entire culture’s philosophy, and that interaction in a globalised world 
requires familiarity with the views of “the other” as a matter of prudence. A third 
important rationale, however, is epistemic: any long-standing culture probably has some 
insight into the human condition, such that one risks being mistaken about what counts 
as a good leader if one remains unfamiliar with African culture. Despite having been a 
largely oral tradition until recently, African philosophy and related ideas have been in 
existence for at least several hundred years and, as this article is meant to show, their 
implications for leadership merit global consideration.
This article draws on the indigenous African intellectual tradition to ground a moral-
philosophical theory of leadership that is meant to constitute a plausible rival to salient 
accounts of leadership in the East Asian and Western traditions. Specifically, it articulates 
an interpretation of the characteristically African value of communion, and indicates how 
this Afro-communal value system grounds a certain ideal approach to leadership. Along 
the way, the article contrasts the implications of Afro-communal leadership particularly 
with those of Confucianism and Kantian contract theory, and suggests that the African 
theory deserves to be treated as a viable alternative to them. The article focuses on 
business leadership in the first instance, but the points made should be applicable to a 
wide array of organisations.
Note that, unlike much of literature on African leadership, this article is largely 
prescriptive, and only minimally descriptive. It is not principally concerned to provide 
empirical information about the ways that African peoples have approached leadership 
over the centuries (Masango, 2002), that some Africans currently lead (Jackson, 2004; 
Newenham-Kahindi, 2009; Kuada, 2010), or that contemporary Africans tend to 
understand leadership (Bolden & Kirk, 2009).
In addition, this article does not appeal to all prescriptive ideas about African leadership 
in the contemporary literature or from traditional practices. So, for example, it disregards 
the normative suggestions that African leaders should “uphold the sacredness of 
leadership as the main connection between people and the Creator” (Rukuni, 2009:51; 
see also Ndlovu, 2016) or that “group rights are always more important than individual 
rights” (Rukuni, 2009:107; see also Nkondo, 2007:90-91; Ncube, 2010:81). It also rejects 
the idea that, in order to impart unity to people at the political level, a one-party state is 
justified (as per Nkrumah, 1970:100-101; Rukuni, 2009:154). For yet another example, it 
abjures gendered conceptions of leadership that have been present in some traditional 
settings (see e.g. Nicholson, 2005), but also does not focus on what African values might 
progressively entail for women’s issues (on which see Ndlovu, 2016).
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Instead of trying to accommodate every idea from the African context, this article 
advances a reading of one purportedly basic value from it that should be taken 
seriously by a 21st-century, open-minded philosopher, ethicist or related enquirer from 
any part of the world, and then considers what it entails for good leadership. Such an 
ethical orientation, as is spelled out in the next section (sec. 2), is secular, relational 
and egalitarian. After spelling out this communal ethic, this article draws out of it a 
conception of good leadership (sec. 3), and then applies this conception to a variety of 
topics, including what the final end of an organisation should be, how decisions ought to 
be made within it, who counts as a stakeholder and how to deal with non-performing or 
misbehaving employees (sec. 4). For each topic, the article notes respects in which Afro-
communal leadership supports approaches that differ from those prescribed by other, 
more internationally familiar views of it, and it suggests that its implications are prima 
facie attractive relative to them.2 The article concludes by suggesting some additional 
topics that merit investigation (sec. 5).
2. Communion as a basic African value3
In recent years, there have been a number of literate, philosophical interpretations of the 
African ethical tradition. Although there has of course been moral philosophy amongst 
the black peoples indigenous to the sub-Saharan region for several centuries, it was only 
with the demise of colonialism and the rise of literacy that intricate written works have 
appeared. For example, Kwame Gyekye (1997, 2010) has argued that an attractive African 
ethic at bottom prescribes advancing the common good, whereas Bénézet Bujo (1997) 
and Laurenti Magesa (1997) have contended that it requires fostering an imperceptible 
(“spiritual”) vital energy in oneself and one’s society.
By these accounts, the communitarianism that is well-known for being salient in sub-
Saharan moral thought is of merely instrumental value; communal relationship is solely 
a means to promoting well-being or life-force. In contrast, according to the interpretation 
of sub-Saharan morality favoured here, relationality is, roughly, an end in itself. This 
article cannot show that this latter approach is preferable to its rivals; it is advanced as 
merely one plausible philosophical interpretation of sub-Saharan mores.
This article spells out an Afro-communal ethic in the context of maxims widely taken to 
capture indigenous or traditional sub-Saharan morality, namely, “I am because we are” 
and  “A person is a person through other persons.”4 Although these phrases are sometimes 
used to express a metaphysical claim (viz. that one could not have become who one is 
without living in a certain society), they are also routinely meant to express an ethical 
one. In particular, they are often prescriptions to become a real self or a complete person 
(e.g. Wiredu, 1992; Menkiti, 2004), or, in the influential southern African vernacular, they 
are exhortations to exhibit ubuntu, the Nguni term for humanness or human excellence 
(e.g. Mokgoro, 1998; Tutu, 1999:32-35).
Such an ethic is a eudaemonist or self-realisation perspective, similar to the foundations 
of Aristotelianism and Confucianism. The ultimate answer to the question of why one 
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should live one way rather than another is the fact that it would make one a better 
person. There is a distinctively human and higher part of our nature, and a lower, animal 
self, and both can be realised to various degrees. That is, the thought is that one can be 
more or less of a human, person or self, and one’s basic aim in life should be to develop 
one’s humanness, personhood or selfhood as much as one can. Indeed, it is common 
for those from indigenous African cultures to describe those who are wicked as “not 
persons,” “zero-persons” or even “animals” (Wiredu, 1992:199-200; Gyekye, 1997:49-51; 
Nkulu-N’Sengha, 2009:144). These ascriptions are meant to signify a lack of virtue, but 
not a lack of dignity or full moral status. 
Turning to the second part of the maxims, one becomes a real self “because we are” or 
a complete person “through other persons”, which roughly mean insofar as one prizes 
communal or harmonious relationships with others. As Augustine Shutte, who has 
provided a book-length interpretation of an ubuntu ethic, remarks, “Our deepest moral 
obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply 
into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness 
is excluded” (2001:30). It is common for ethicists working in the African tradition to 
maintain, or at least to suggest, that the only comprehensive respect in which one can 
exhibit human excellence is by relating to others communally or harmoniously. 
To begin to appreciate how one large swathe of African moral thought has been 
fundamentally relational, consider these remarks about sub-Saharan values and norms 
from theorists who are from places as diverse as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda 
and Kenya:
[I]n African societies, immorality is the word or deed which undermines fellowship.
 (Kasenene, 1998:21)
Social harmony is for us (Africans – ed.) the summum bonum – the greatest good. 
Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after good is to be avoided like 
the plague.  (Tutu, 1999:35)
[O]ne should always live and behave in a way that maximises harmonious existence at 
present as well as in the future.  (Murove, 2007:181)
A life of cohesion, or positive integration with others, becomes a goal, one that 
people design modalities for achieving. Let us call this goal communalism, or, as 
other people have called it, communitarianism. In light of this goal, the virtues … also 
become desirable.  (Masolo, 2010:240)
Talk of “fellowship,” “harmony” and “cohesion” is recurrent in the above quotations, 
which suggest that these are to be valued for their own sake. That approach differs 
from the idea that these ways of relating are valuable merely as a means to some other 
value, such as the common good or vital force. It also is prima facie distinct from the 
most salient philosophical approaches to morally right action in the contemporary West, 
which appeal at bottom to utility promotion, respect for autonomy, agreement in a social 
contract or God’s will.5
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The next question is how one is to understand these relational goods, or what this article 
most often refers to as “communion”. Representative African theorists are again quoted 
about what it means to live in communion, harmony, etc. with others, after which the 
article draws on their comments to advance a principle to guide thought about leadership 
matters, particularly but not solely as they concern a business: 
Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to 
play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all.  (Gbadegesin, 1991:65)
[H]armony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations within the group. 
 (Mokgoro, 1998:17)
The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an overall way of life, 
inspired by the notion of the common good.  (Gyekye, 2004:16)
[T]he purpose of our life is community-service and community-belongingness. 
  (Iroegbu, 2005:442)
If you asked ubuntu advocates and philosophers: What principles inform and organise 
your life? … the answers would express commitment to the good of the community in 
which their identities were formed, and a need to experience their lives as bound up in 
that of their community.  (Nkondo, 2007:91)
What is striking about these characterisations of how to commune, harmonise or 
otherwise become a real person is that two distinct relational goods are repeatedly 
mentioned, namely, considering oneself part of the whole, being close, sharing a way of 
life, belonging and experiencing oneself as bound up with others, on the one hand, and 
then achieving the good of all, being sympathetic, acting for the common good, serving 
the community and being committed to the good of one’s society, on the other. 
These two facets of a communal relationship have been distinguished and reconstructed 
with some precision (Metz, 2013, 2017a). It is revealing to understand the relationship of 
“identifying” with others or “sharing a way of life” with them (i.e. being close, belonging, 
etc.) to be the combination of exhibiting certain psychological attitudes of cohesion 
and cooperative behaviour consequent to them. The attitudes include a tendency to 
think of oneself as a member of a group with the other and to refer to oneself as a 
“we” (rather than an “I”), a disposition to feel pride or shame in what the other or one’s 
group does and, at a higher level of intensity, an emotional appreciation of the other’s 
nature and value. The cooperative behaviours include being transparent about the terms 
of interaction, allowing others to make voluntary choices, acting on the basis of trust, 
adopting compatible goals and, at the extreme end, choosing for the reason that “this is 
who we are”.
What is labelled the relationship of “exhibiting solidarity” with or “caring” for others 
(i.e. acting for others’ good, etc.) is similarly aptly construed as the combination of 
exhibiting certain psychological attitudes and engaging in helpful behaviour. Here, the 
attitudes are ones positively oriented towards the other’s good, and they include an 
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empathetic awareness of the other’s condition and a sympathetic emotional reaction to 
this awareness. The actions are not merely those likely to be beneficial, that is, to meet 
her biological, psychological and social needs, but also ones done consequent to certain 
motives, say, for the sake of making the other better off or even a better person.
Bringing things together, here are some concrete and explicit principled interpretations 
of “I am because we are” and “A person is a person through other persons”: one should 
strive to become a real self, which is matter of prizing those capable of identity and 
solidarity. Or, one ought to develop personhood, which means honouring people by 
virtue of their dignified ability to be party to communal relationships of sharing a way of 
life and caring for others’ quality of life.
Conversely, one lacking in human excellence, or who is “not a person”, would be one 
who fails to respect those able to commune. Substantial vice or wrongdoing by this 
ethic consists of prizing the opposite, discordant relationships of acting on an “us versus 
them” attitude, subordinating others, harming them and doing so out of indifference to 
their good.
This philosophical specification of a communal ethic appears to capture well the moral 
value of many salient traditional practices south of the Sahara desert. In brief, recurrent 
themes of consensus-seeking in the realm of politics, collective harvesting when it comes 
to production and reconciliation in the sphere of criminal justice are all plausibly viewed 
as ways of prizing communion or honouring people by virtue of their communal nature.6
To “honour” or “prize” communion, or those capable of it, is a deontological notion, and so 
is to be contrasted with a consequentialist prescription to promote communion as much 
as one can, and wherever one can, in the long run. So, for example, one should give some 
priority to the communal relationships of which one is already a part, instead of cutting 
them off if doing so would foster marginally more communion on the part of others. 
Ceteris paribus, the stronger and longer one’s communal ties with others, the greater 
the obligation to help them. This interpretation of partiality is meant to reconstruct the 
traditional practice of prioritising aid to blood relatives (on which see Appiah, 1998).
However, partiality is not meant to be absolute, and the urgent needs of strangers, 
who also matter for their own sake by virtue of being capable of communion, merit 
consideration and must be weighed up against the interests of intimates. The impartial 
idea that every person has dignity is also prominent in the African tradition (Wiredu, 
1992:199-200; Gyekye, 2010:sec. 6), and is expressed here in terms of the natural ability to 
be communed with and to commune. 
In addition, honouring communion means that one normally should not seek to realise 
it by means of substantial discord, at least when it is directed towards innocent parties. 
This restriction on how to promote communion is a way to accommodate human rights, 
which more or less protect innocent individuals from being egregiously used merely as 
a means to a greater (perceived) good. The Afro-communal principle therefore is not 
consequentialist in the sense of implying that the means by which one maximises a state 
of affairs lacks moral significance in itself.
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There is much more that could be said to spell out and to motivate this Afro-communal 
ethic. For example, the question of which others to commune with could use more 
discussion. Do they include imperceptible persons such as ancestors, or perhaps some 
non-persons such as animals? These are important issues, but they do not need to be 
addressed here, in order to draw some reasonably firm conclusions about what counts 
as good leadership in relation to human persons. It is enough to note that a moral agent 
at least must respect human beings capable of communion, where those with whom she 
has already communed are entitled to some priority relative to strangers, whose needs 
nonetheless matter by virtue of being potential sites of communion. 
3. From an Afro-communal ethic to an account  
 of leadership
The rest of this article works to apply the ethic from the previous section to an array of 
issues pertaining to good leadership. This section provides an abstract characterisation 
of how to lead in terms of the Afro-communal ethic, while the following section applies 
it to several concrete matters, such as how to make decisions in a firm and whom to treat 
as a stakeholder.
In the light of the previous section’s analysis, one can now grasp the import of maxims 
about leadership from the literature that might otherwise have been opaque. For 
example, probably the most common saying in an African context about good leadership 
is, “A king is a king through his people” (e.g. Pheko & Linchwe, 2008:399, 409; Mofuoa, 
2015:32). There is also this remark: “Leaders have a deep awareness that they are what 
they are because of other people” (Nussbaum, Palsule & Mkhize, 2010:10). Notice how 
these maxims echo the ones about personhood (“A person is a person through other 
persons”) and selfhood (“I am because we are”) from the previous section. Supposing 
the communal interpretation of ethical behaviour in general made there is plausible, it 
would make sense to construe these statements about leadership this way: one should 
become a real leader, which one can do insofar as one relates communally and enables 
others to commune.
This conception is an instance of servant leadership, which phrase abounds in the 
literature on African approaches to leadership (Mbigi & Maree, 2005:102; Nicholson, 
2005:260-261; Bhengu, 2006:185-187, 229; Khoza, 2006:58-59; Mbigi, 2007:298-301; Msila, 
2014; Ndlovu, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ngcaweni, 2017). Broadly speaking, a servant 
leader is not so much one who gets others to do what he wants or thinks best, but is 
roughly one who does much to help others. Servant leadership is of course not unfamiliar 
in the Western literature (e.g. Greenleaf, 2002). However, unlike in the Western literature 
on leadership, servant leadership is the patently predominant theme in the African 
literature on it. In addition, the Afro-communal ethic grounds a distinct specification 
of precisely what should be involved in helping others: a good leader is one who helps 
to meet others’ needs, and above all their need to realise their social nature by prizing 
communal relationship. 
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By this approach, communion is a way of relating to be pursued as an end, not merely 
as a means to other values such as, say, productivity or innovation (which is what is 
emphasised, at times, in Mbigi & Maree, 2005:viii, 2, 65, 114, 117; Bhengu, 2006:155, 157, 
169-170). The Afro-communal ethic should not be read as entailing the banalities that 
social capital or effective teamwork are useful to succeed in a competitive environment. 
Instead, it supports the bolder claim that a good leader seeks out a certain way of relating 
for its own sake.
4. Implications of Afro-communal leadership
What would a firm or other large organisation look like if it were guided by the Afro-
communal conception of good leadership? For example, what would the firm strive 
to achieve, how would decisions be made within it and whom would it consider to be 
stakeholders? This section answers these kinds of questions, often drawing contrasts 
with typical East Asian and Western conceptions of good leadership. 
4.1 What is the point of a firm?
Prizing communion differs from goal-pursuit, as per Kantianism, or desire-satisfaction, 
as per utilitarianism, which are characteristically Western and individualist views of 
what a firm, or other organisation with a large public influence, ultimately ought to be 
striving to achieve. Instead of the point of a firm being to satisfy contingent and variable 
demand, a firm lead by Afro-communal values would exhibit solidarity with consumers, 
meaning that it would do what is expected to enable them to live objectively better lives, 
particularly socio-moral ones. 
This orientation towards people’s needs, and especially their virtue, means that there 
would be reflection amongst at least shareholders and managers on whether a firm is 
selling something that is, if not in fact good for people, then at least likely to be (cf. Lutz, 
2009). If an Afro-communal leader took over a firm that sold cigarettes or food with 
trans fats, she would make a concerted effort to shift production towards something 
that, for all we can tell, would not cause addiction, inflict serious bodily harm and, as 
a consequence of these, disrupt familial and friendly relationships. Consumers might 
freely choose bad things, but that is not a sufficient reason to sell them for one who 
deems good leadership to consist of prizing communion. 
Confucian values, so prominent in East Asia, are also well known for similarly directing a 
firm to act in an objectively beneficent way towards consumers (e.g. Ip, 2009). In addition, 
Confucianism is characteristically relational, as opposed to individualist, and so again is 
similar to the Afro-communal ethic. However, one difference with the Afro-communal 
approach, in terms of what the final end of a firm should be, is that Confucianism tends 
to prize relationship as a final value to be promoted that can be distinct from the good 
of individuals.7 If relationships such as balance or integration have some significant 
final value in themselves, then a leader could wind up treating individuals merely as 
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a means to the end of promoting them, something admitted by those sympathetic to 
Confucianism (e.g. Ip, 2009:470; and Li, 2014:14). In contrast, by the Afro-communal 
conception of leadership, each person has a dignity in virtue of her capacity to commune 
and to be communed with, which means that, to treat every person with respect, a leader 
must strive to meet the needs of each.
4.2 Whom should a firm aid? 
A firm cannot meet the needs of literally all; it must rather attend to those of its 
stakeholders. But who counts as a stakeholder, that is, as someone for whom a firm has 
moral reason to go out of its way to aid?
In the Western tradition, there are two main moral reasons to help someone: she is 
amongst the worst off and so owed aid because of a general duty to help, or she is 
someone whom we have assumed an obligation to aid in particular, say, by promising or 
by accepting the benefits from a cooperative scheme of which she is a member. By this 
largely Kantian and Rawlsian approach, the leader of a firm roughly must take positive 
steps to carry out what it has contracted to do and must also donate, in the form of a 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) programme, to those who are especially badly off.
In addition to these two moral reasons to aid others, the Afro-communal ethic grounds a 
third reason: one has already related communally with others (Metz, 2017b; Woermann 
& Engelbrecht, 2017). If one has been party to a communal relationship with others 
intensely or for a long time, and especially both, then one can have some strong moral 
reason to aid these intimates as opposed to strangers, even if the latter are worse off and 
if one did not promise to aid the former. 
Consider one’s reason to aid one’s children. It is not that they are amongst the worst 
off or are badly off at all, at least for most readers of this article. It is also not that one 
promised to do so; few of us have ever made an agreement to continue to look after our 
children as opposed to aiding other people’s children. Or, more deeply, if we did make 
such a promise, we plausibly would have been obligated to aid our own children even if 
we had not. The natural explanation of the duty to aid one’s own children is that one has 
exhibited identity and solidarity with them in substantial ways and over a long period 
of time. To the extent that one’s relationships with friends, co-workers and neighbours 
are similar in nature and extent to one’s relationships with one’s children (even if less 
intense and shorter in duration), one also has unassumed duties of some weight to aid 
them as opposed to others. Communion encumbers. 
Applied to a business context, Afro-communal leadership would mean that a firm goes 
out of its way to help not merely those in desperate need of aid or those it has promised 
to aid, but also those with whom it has shared a way of life in some respect, including 
its society.8 African thinkers have sometimes noted the duty of a firm to aid society 
(Bhengu, 2006:160-161; Amaeshi & Idemudia, 2015), but the appeal to Afro-communal 
leadership explains why the duty obtains: a firm has at least identified with the society 
in which it is based and therefore has moral reason to exhibit solidarity with it, too. 
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An additional implication is that if a firm has a long-standing relationship with a 
particular supplier, the former’s leaders would have some moral reason to continue to 
contract with the latter, even if a new supplier would be marginally less expensive. The 
reason is merely pro tanto and not invariably conclusive, i.e. a firm’s leaders need not 
continue to contract with a supplier regardless of how expensive its goods or how shoddy 
its services become. The point is that there would usually be some moral cost to dumping 
a long-standing supplier. Furthermore, in those cases in which there would be little or no 
moral cost to breaking ties with such a stakeholder, a likely explanation would be that 
this supplier has itself failed to live up to its respective obligation to commune and has 
instead become exploitive or neglectful. 
Running with this dimension of partiality in African ethics, two scholars have 
recently suggested that, when it is applied to the context of business ethics, the word 
“stakeholders” should be replaced with “relationholders” (Woermann & Engelbrecht, 
2017). For them, stakeholder-talk is “contaminated” by the idea that “different parties’ 
interests are dependent on the power and influence that these parties can exert on the 
organisation due to the strength of the contractual underpinnings of their claims or 
stakes” (Woermann & Engelbrecht, 2017). In contrast, the word “relationholder” highlights 
the idea that sometimes a firm can have some moral reason to aid particular individuals 
beyond contractual terms with them or any voluntary assumption of an obligation to aid 
them. Prior relationship can be sufficient to provide reason of some weight to continue 
or even strengthen it. 
4.3 How should a firm make decisions?
An account of which decisions a firm should make (say, when it comes to which final 
ends to pursue or whom to count as being owed aid) is one thing, while an account of 
how to make those decisions is another. How should business and other leaders arrive at 
a determination of which policies and practices to adopt? 
Here, the Afro-communal theory parts ways with much of both the East Asian and 
Western traditions of philosophical thought about leadership. Typical Western thinkers 
and managers, appealing to Kantian (or Lockean) ideas, consider consent to be ruled to 
be sufficient to give managers the authority to determine the course of a firm. Basically, 
the fact that a worker has contracted to submit her labour-power to the direction of a 
firm’s managers in exchange for a wage is enough to warrant her obedience to managerial 
decree. East Asian thinkers and managers, appealing particularly to Confucianism, 
consider superior qualifications sufficient to give managers the authority to govern the 
workplace (e.g. Ip, 2009:469-470). Both traditions can of course recommend consultation 
with employees as often being a useful way to further the proper final ends of a firm. 
However, neither approach entails that input, let alone authorisation, from employees is 
morally required as a way to give them their due. 
Afro-communal leadership, in contrast, does. Perhaps the most salient theme in the 
literature on good leadership in the sub-Saharan tradition is the idea that leaders 
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should normally deploy consensual democracy when making decisions (Bhengu, 1996, 
2006:191-193, 230; Nussbaum, 2003; Mbigi & Maree, 2005:8, 29-30, 58-60; Khoza, 2006; 
Boon, 2007:82-93, 103-109, 125, 150-152; Mbigi, 2007:299-300; Louw, 2010; Ncube, 
2010:79-80). By this approach, it is not enough to consult with employees or even to 
give them a vote; in addition, all in the firm should usually be expected to agree to the 
essentials before going forward. Agreeing does not imply that everyone comes to share 
the same judgement, but instead means, at the core, that no one has objections to the 
proposal so strenuous as to hold back the rest from acting on it.
Such an approach seems to follow directly from the Afro-communal ethic expounded 
above. If a key goal is to realise communion in a firm or other organisation, then a leader 
will aim to ensure that all genuinely share a way of life, which includes sharing the power 
to create it together. Sharing a way of life, as explained above, is not merely people living 
the same way, which way of life could be imposed from above. Instead, it essentially 
includes cooperative participation, prescribing unanimitarian democracy when feasible, 
not merely when it comes to (representative) political legislation, but also other major 
public spheres of life. 
Two additional facets of communion would be reliably fostered by consensual democracy. 
Such an approach to decision making would best enable people to enjoy a sense 
of togetherness, thinking of themselves as a “we” and taking pride in their collective 
accomplishments. And, then, consensual democracy would usually be expected to realise 
solidarity (on which see Gyekye, 1997:130-131, 142). Everyone’s interests are most likely 
to be promoted when everyone freely signs onto a policy consequent to deliberation 
about it. 
4.4 How should a workplace be organised?
In the 21st century efficiency is invariably sought by means of managerialism, in both 
the East and the West. That is, in order to maximise outputs and minimise inputs, 
subordinates are steered, usually with money or power, in ways that call for the 
production of standardised outputs according to measurable criteria. Such an approach 
is thought to be justified philosophically either by the idea that managerialist production 
would benefit society or that it has been freely agreed to by workers. Afro-communal 
leadership, however, is ambivalent about the aptness of such a mode of production. 
On the one hand, a firm has moral reason to commune with shareholders and with 
consumers, which provides some reason for it to “squeeze” employees to do what it takes 
to produce goods/services efficiently. If managerialism best fostered efficiency of a sort 
that was likely to make the lives of shareholders and consumers objectively better off, 
that would be some reason for a leader to use it to orient the workplace. 
On the other hand, managerialism is on the face of it “anti-social” when it comes to the 
way that managers treat employees (as per Metz, 2017c). It hardly fosters a sense of 
togetherness between these two groups of people. Its use of steering mechanisms, such 
as financial incentives and punitive threats, is prima facie incompatible with cooperative 
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participation on the part of workers. Although workers might gain financially from doing 
well by managerialist criteria, their own good in the production process is of little interest 
beyond avoiding health and safety violations. Finally, managerialism is unlikely to foster 
sympathy, and probably encourages managers to view workers as human resources, not 
so much as people whose interests matter for their own sake. 
In addition, managerialism plausibly alienates workers from each other, too, not just 
from managers. If workers are competing against each other for scarce rewards, as is 
often the case, then a spirit of camaraderie amongst them and an inclination of some to 
sacrifice for the sake of others are discouraged. 
It appears, therefore, that the value of communion pulls in different directions when it 
comes to how to organise a workplace. As two scholars have recently noted (Woermann 
& Engelbrecht, 2017), by an African ethic that prizes communal relationship, employees 
are particularly important stakeholders (or “relationholders”). Typically the relationship 
between them and the firm is especially intimate and long-standing, meaning that the 
firm owes them quite a lot, and that their needs are not invariably to be sacrificed for 
the sake of the interests of shareholders and consumers. Even so, there are some clear 
and substantial benefits from managerialism, at least in terms of making money and 
satisfying demand – which could be ways of meeting needs.
The natural resolution of the tension is compromise. Here are two examples of how a 
leader inspired by Afro-communal values might proceed. 
First, he might retain the use of numerical targets that workers must meet, but not set 
them down unilaterally. Instead, he could go beyond merely consulting with workers 
about targets by obtaining their unanimous agreement to them, upon discussion of what 
would be best for all those affected by the firm. 
Second, a leader might retain the use of a year-end bonus to express appreciation and to 
motivate, but not allocate it strictly in proportion to the quantified output of individuals. 
Instead, he could award the same bonus to all those who have done well enough, if 
not share profits in a more robust sense with them (briefly suggested by Bhengu, 
2006:179-180, 192; and Ncube, 2010:79). 
4.5 How are emotions of relevance to an organisation?
Any plausible view of leadership will entail that a leader is good insofar as she takes 
employees’ emotions into account. However, what stands out about the Afro-communal 
approach to leadership is that cultivating certain feelings and attitudes is good for its 
own sake, not merely as a means to an end in order to motivate employees to perform, 
the natural approach of Confucianism and Kantian contract theory. 
A communal relationship is not merely behavioural, that is, not merely a matter of 
coordination and mutual aid. In addition, it is, in part, essentially psychological and 
specifically emotional. For one, part of a communal relationship involves a sense of 
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togetherness such as feeling pride in what others accomplish and liking being with 
others. For another, communion includes feeling sympathy and compassion for others. 
Insofar as one major task of a leader is to forge communion in a firm, she must therefore 
be committed to prompting such feelings and attitudes, and do so as ends in themselves. 
Such a theoretical rationale explains why some African leadership proponents have been 
right to recommend – fascinatingly – that an organisation include ritual, prayer, song 
and dance (Mbigi & Maree, 2005:50-52, 102, 108; Bhengu, 2006:186-187; Boon, 2007:68, 83; 
Rukuni,  2009:119-120). These would be ways to bring people closer together on an 
emotional level and thereby to realise communion along a certain dimension.
4.6 How should conflict be resolved? 
Consider two ways of dealing with actual and potential problems in the workplace that 
Afro-communal leadership would abjure. First, note that American managers are known 
for having the discretion to fire at will for under-performance or misbehaviour. At the 
end of the 20th century, more than two-thirds of American workers could be dismissed 
immediately for failing to perform (or even for no cause at all, on which see Hiley, 1985:1), 
an approach that is on the face of it consistent with a contractual ethical orientation. 
Second, think about the reputation that Chinese managers in Africa have for hiring 
Chinese labourers, and not so much African ones, because the former are expected to 
be more highly skilled and compliant than the latter. Although it appears that such 
practices are in fact not so widespread (on which see Sautman & Hairong, 2015; and 
Xiaoyang, 2016), it is worth considering what would be wrong with them from an Afro-
communal perspective.
There is an underlying similarity between immediately dismissing someone perceived 
to be a problem in the workplace and not even hiring those expected to be: exclusion. In 
contrast, inclusion is a salient theme in the literature on African leadership. It highlights 
using emotional intelligence to address conflict, trying hard to develop weak employees 
and enabling everyone to feel part of a community (Blunt & Jones, 1997:15; Nicholson, 
2005:261; Boon, 2007:62-63; Msila, 2014:1107). Conspicuously absent from African thought 
about leadership are ideas of using fear, imposing retribution or simply removing an 
employee altogether (without having tried to bring him up to speed). 
Again, a focus on communion provides a plausible theoretical explanation of why 
inclusiveness should be the overarching approach of a good leader. If what matters 
morally about us is our capacity to commune and to be communed with, then respect for 
that special value will mean creating relationships and repairing them when they have 
broken down. Instead of summarily dismissing an employee who has made a mistake, a 
good leader would try to ascertain why she did so, consider whether the employee could 
be reformed and, if so, offer a second chance. And instead of avoiding hiring people who 
might be more difficult to work with as employees, a good leader would give them a 
chance and do what he could to develop their abilities, particularly if he were a visitor 
in their land. 
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For one inspiring vision of what inclusiveness can mean, consider the tale of a 19th 
century southern African military leader who, upon having successfully repelled an 
attack, sent the losing party cattle as a present (Mofuoa, 2015:28, 32; Prozesky, 2015:10). 
There is something dignified here, which would be missing if the leader had instead 
sought to make an example of the defeated warriors, imposed retribution on them 
for their wrongful attack, or even simply left them to fend for themselves in disarray. 
A compelling question is how such an attitude might be displayed in a business context.
5. Conclusion: some additional issues
It is not obvious what makes someone a good leader, particularly in the light of 
conflicting value systems around the world. This article has expounded a conception 
of good leadership that is under-appreciated in the English-speaking literature on 
the topic. Specifically, it has drawn on the African intellectual tradition to develop a 
normative theory of leadership in terms of prizing people by virtue of their capacity 
to relate communally. Although some of its concrete prescriptions have already been 
recommended in the literature, this article has aimed to show how they can all be 
theoretically grounded on the basic value of communion that is prominent in African 
philosophical discussions of morality. It has also sought to argue that these prescriptions 
constitute plausible alternatives to what characteristically East Asian or Western 
accounts of leadership support.
Supposing the attempt to ground various dimensions of good leadership on an Afro-
communal ethic has been prima facie attractive, other matters also merit investigation. 
For example, is communion compatible with innovation and entrepreneurialism, which 
are so important not merely for business but really any organisation with a significant 
influence on the public? Or, are these best justified by individualist and so largely Western 
values? Is there a characteristically indigenous African approach to time, and, if so, is 
it a function of communion? Is it compatible with (enough) efficiency? Is consensual 
democracy to be favoured in literally every context, or is it inappropriate when it comes to 
dealing with, say, children in a family and soldiers during a time of war? If this article has 
been successful, the reader will agree that these questions merit answers in future work.
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Endnotes
1. This article uses geographical labels such as “African” and “Western” to mean features salient 
in a large array of space and over a long span of time (as per Metz 2015). Hence, these terms 
imply neither that these features can be found solely in this place, nor that they can be found 
everywhere in it. 
2. This article focuses on contrasting the implications of Afro-communal leadership with 
common practices that are prescribed by familiar philosophies of leadership in East Asia and 
the West, not with practices in these latter locales that might be exceptions to the rule. Its 
aim is to advance a theory grounded on African values that entails and plausibly explains 
intuitively attractive facets of leadership, which is not to suggest that contexts beyond Africa 
are devoid of good leadership or some instances of a communal approach towards it. 
3. Much of this section borrows from previously published work, particularly Metz (2016). 
What is intended to be new here is not the theoretical interpretation of African ideas about 
community, but rather their application to considerations of leadership. 
4. For a survey of how several sub-Saharan peoples understand these maxims, see Nkulu-
N’Sengha (2009). 
5. For contrasts with the ethic of care, see Metz (2013). 
6. For a much fuller account of the status of these practices as African, and reason to think that 
the communal ethic best justifies them, see Metz (2017a). 
7. There are strands of African ethics that are similarly corporatist, ascribing final value to a 
group, and not to individuals insofar as they are capable of relating in certain ways. For one 
clear example, see Ake (1987).
8. Although typical Western moral theories have difficulty accounting for this sort of duty, 
Confucian ethics, which is relational, does so easily (see discussion of guanxi in, e.g. Chang & 
Holt, 1991).
